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HAVE LICENSE, WILL TRAVEL: AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE NEW ABA MULTIJURISDICTIONAL 
PRACTICE RULES 
CYNTHIA L. FOUNTAINE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose you are a lawyer who is licensed to practice in New York. 
What happens when your New York client has a dispute with a business 
competitor in California? May you go to California to interview witnesses 
and advise your client? May you go to California to negotiate a settlement 
designed to avoid litigation? If your settlement efforts fail, may you 
initiate arbitration or file suit in California? What ethical rules are you 
bound to follow while you are in California—New York’s? California’s? 
Neither? Both?1 It might surprise you to know that merely by calling your 
client in California and giving legal advice over the telephone, you might 
violate California’s unauthorized-practice-of-law statute, which could 
make you subject to criminal sanctions or keep you from being able to 
recover fees for your work.2 
Multijurisdictional practice (“MJP”)—that is, law practice in a host 
state by an out-of-state lawyer who is licensed in a different home state—
raises two primary issues: (1) is the out-of-state lawyer violating the host 
state’s unauthorized practice of law (“UPL”) regulations; and (2) if the 
lawyer is permitted to practice in the host state, what ethical rules must the 
lawyer follow while carrying out the work in the host state? These issues 
are even more complicated by issues of whether or not litigation is 
pending, and if so, whether it is pending in state or federal court.  
States have a recognized interest in limiting MJP and in strictly 
regulating lawyers practicing within their jurisdictions.3 This interest is 
 * Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; J.D., 1988, The University of 
Southern California; B.S., 1984, Indiana University (Bloomington). Much thanks goes to Chris Barrett 
and Lori Kaspar for their excellent research assistance. 
 1. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 911 F. Supp. 148 (D.N.J. 1995) 
(deciding which of several states’ ethical rules apply to plaintiffs’ lawyers’ ex parte communication 
with defendant’s past and present employees). 
 2. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998) 
(holding that New York lawyers were not entitled to recover fees for work done in California on behalf 
of a client under California’s Professional Code). 
 
 
737 
 3. States’ power to regulate law practice stems from a combination of recognition of state 
courts’ inherent power to regulate the practice of law before them and state constitutional power to 
exercise this power. See, e.g., In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. 1999) (“The 
Supreme Court of Texas has inherent power to regulate the practice of law in Texas . . . . The Court’s 
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based primarily on the state’s interests in protecting its citizens from 
incompetence and protecting the state’s judicial system.4 By requiring 
state licensure as a prerequisite to practice, the state protects its ability to 
enforce ethical and professional standards.  
However, lawyers have an increasing need to fully represent their 
clients’ cross-border interests and are increasingly able to competently 
provide these services.5 Lawyers’ increased need to engage in MJP stems 
from changes in the national and international economies that increase 
clients’ cross-border interests and, consequently, their need for cross-
border legal services. Lawyers’ increased competence in MJP arises out of 
technological innovations that improve access to other states’ laws6 and 
changes in communication technology that facilitate a lawyer’s ability to 
“virtually” represent clients’ interests in other states.7 Thus, MJP rules 
should represent a balance of the states’ regulatory interests and lawyers’ 
increasing need and ability to engage in MJP.8 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) 5.5 and 
8.5 are designed to regulate MJP.9 Recognizing important deficiencies in 
these rules, the ABA recently adopted significant amendments.10 The 
primary goals of the amendments are formally to recognize the cross-
border nature of modern law practice and to promote uniform rules that 
inherent power is derived in part from Article II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution, which divides 
State governmental power among three departments. The authority conveyed to the Supreme Court by 
this constitutional provision includes the regulation of judicial affairs and the direction of the 
administration of justice in the judicial department. Within this authority is the power to govern the 
practice of law. The Court’s inherent power under Article II, Section 1 to regulate Texas law practice 
is assisted by statute, primarily the State Bar Act.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Nolo Press, 991 S.W.2d at 769 (Tex. 1999) (“The Supreme Court of Texas has 
inherent power to regulate the practice of law in Texas for the benefit and protection of the justice 
system and the people as a whole.”). 
 5. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism and Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 
82 MINN. L. REV. 73, 82-83 (1997) [hereinafter Moulton]. 
 6. For example, Westlaw, Lexis, and various Internet legal research sites provide easy access to 
the law of all the states. 
 7. Ann L. MacNaughton & Gary A. Munneke, Practicing Law Across Geographic and 
Professional Borders: What Does the Future Hold?, 47 LOY. L. REV. 665, 669 (2001). 
 8. Wayne J. Positon, Report of the Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice, American Bar 
Association Center for Professional Responsibility at 5 (Aug. 2002), available at http://www. 
aba.net.org/cpr/mjp/final_mjp_rpt_5-17.pdf [hereinafter MJP Comm’n Final Report]; see also Mary 
M. Johnston, Multi-Jurisdictional Practice: Emerging Issues from a Delaware Perspective, 5 DEL. L. 
REV. 57, 85-86 (2002). 
 9. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2003); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 8.5 (2003). 
 10. Many of the amendments reflect current formal and informal MJP rules and customs 
heretofore unrecognized by the ABA and by many states. 
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will enable lawyers to accurately predict the limits of their authority to 
represent their clients’ cross-border interests.11  
First, this Article will describe some of the shortcomings of the old 
Model Rules in regulating MJP. Second, the Article will introduce and 
explain the new rules governing MJP. The Article will conclude that the 
amendments succeed in recognizing the realities of modern cross-border 
law practice and in providing a more effective model framework for MJP 
regulation, but the amendments do not fully achieve the ABA’s central 
goal of creating uniform rules that will ensure predictability in MJP. 
II. REGULATION OF MJP: MODEL RULE 5.5 
Old Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5 subjects a lawyer to UPL 
regulation for practicing law in a state other than the state in which the 
lawyer is licensed. Old Rule 5.5, which is currently the law in most 
jurisdictions, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not: (a) practice law in a 
jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession 
in that jurisdiction; or (b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in 
the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of 
law.”12 This rule leaves the precise contours of UPL regulation to a host 
state’s law.13 Notwithstanding the absence of a uniform definition of law 
practice, old Model Rule 5.5 is quite strict on its face. However, several 
exceptions are commonly recognized, including affiliation with local 
counsel14 and pro hac vice admission for limited purposes in connection 
with particular pending litigation.15 Other narrow exceptions exist,16 but 
none of these exceptions effectively recognize or deal with the increase in 
cross-border law practice.  
 11. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2003); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 8.5 (2003). 
 12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (1983) (amended 2003). 
 13. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 2 (2003) (“The definition of the practice 
of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another.”). But cf. MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 (1980) (defining the “practice of law” as relating “to the rendition of 
services for others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer”). See also Cynthia L. Fountaine, 
When is a Computer a Lawyer?: Interactive Legal Software, Unlicensed Practice of Law, and the First 
Amendment, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 147, 150-51 (2002) (describing various definitions of law practice). 
 14. DEBORAH L. RHODE & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
REGULATION 179 (2002) [hereinafter RHODE & HAZARD]. 
 15. Although every state permits pro hac vice admission, the standards and processes for pro hac 
vice admission differ from state to state. See MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 44. 
 16. For example, some states allow in-house lawyers to provide out-of-state legal services on 
behalf of their employer if they register with the local bar’s regulatory authority, and some states allow 
out-of-state lawyers to be licensed for limited practice as legal consultants. See RHODE & HAZARD, 
supra note 14, at 180. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p737 Fountaine book pages.doc2/4/2004  5:57 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
740 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:737 
 
 
 
 
 
In particular, there is a glaring lack of uniformity of approach to this 
issue in various jurisdictions, leaving a lawyer unsure at the time of 
accepting a representation whether the lawyer can fully represent the 
client’s interests in all places they might be impacted.17 In addition, the 
narrow, litigation-oriented exceptions to old Model Rule 5.5’s general 
prohibition against MJP do not provide lawyers with the flexibility they 
need to represent their clients’ pre- and non-litigation interests in other 
states. 
The problems with old Model Rule 5.5 are illustrated by Birbrower, 
Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, a California 
Supreme Court case.18 This case is significant not only because it 
demonstrates the problems and dangers that arise when a lawyer represents 
a client with interests outside the state in which the lawyer is licensed, but 
also because the opinion led to the formation of the ABA Commission on 
Multijurisdictional Practice (“MJP Commission”) to address the very 
serious issues involved in the increasingly cross-border character of 
American law practice.19  
The facts of Birbrower are straightforward. New York lawyers 
represented a corporation with offices in New York and California in a 
contract dispute against a California software corporation.20 In connection 
with the representation, the New York lawyers made several trips to 
California to meet with the client’s corporate officers, negotiate with the 
software company, and initiate arbitration proceedings.21 No lawsuit was 
pending and the dispute settled before arbitration was initiated.22 The 
client, unhappy with the results of the settlement, filed suit against the 
New York lawyers in California state court,23 alleging legal malpractice 
and related claims.24 The New York lawyers counterclaimed against the 
client for attorney fees.25  
The issue before the California Supreme Court was whether the New 
York lawyers had violated California’s UPL statute in the course of 
 17. Moulton, supra note 5, at 91-98. 
 18. 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998). 
 19. The results of this Commission were the proposed amendments to Model Rules 5.5 and 8.5, 
which the ABA adopted in December 2002. 
 20. 949 P.2d at 3. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 5. 
 23. The defendants removed the case to federal court, but the case was remanded to the 
California superior court. Id. at 4. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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representing their client.26 California’s UPL statute provided, “No person 
shall practice law in California unless the person is an active member of 
the State Bar.”27 The statute left the definition of “practice law” to the 
courts.28 The California Supreme Court held that law practice was defined 
as “the doing and performing services in a court of justice in any matter 
depending therein throughout its various stages and in conformity with the 
adopted rules of procedure.”29 This included, according to the court, “legal 
advice and legal instrument and contract preparation, whether or not these 
subjects were rendered in the course of litigation.”30  
According to the court, the New York lawyers’ mere representational 
activities, if undertaken within the state of California, were sufficient to 
subject them to California’s UPL statute.31 It was irrelevant that the 
subject matter of the representation did not involve pending litigation.  
The court next addressed the meaning of “in California,” for purposes 
of the statute.32 In defining “in California,” the court assessed the quantity 
and nature of the lawyers’ activities in the state.33 In language remarkably 
reminiscent of the personal jurisdiction doctrine that defines presence 
within a state for due process purposes, the California Supreme Court 
found that “[m]ere fortuitous or attenuated contacts will not sustain a 
finding that the unlicensed lawyer practiced law ‘in California.’ The 
primary inquiry is whether the unlicensed lawyer engaged in sufficient 
activities in the state or created a continuing relationship with the 
California client that included legal duties and obligations.”34  
The court did not require physical presence in the state but indicated 
that physical presence would be a factor to consider. 35 For example, the 
court noted that “advising a California client on California law in 
connection with a California legal dispute by telephone, fax, computer, or 
other modern technological means” would suffice to establish the contact 
with California needed to satisfy the “in California” requirement of the 
 26. Id. at 5. 
 27. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (West 2003). Remedies for violation of the statute included 
criminal misdemeanor penalties and denial of fees for services performed in violation of the statute. 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6126 (West 2003); 949 P.2d at 5.  
 28. See 949 P.2d at 5. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagon v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298-99 (1980) (holding that 
marginal and attenuated benefits were insufficient to justify an exercise of in personam jurisdiction). 
 35. 949 P.2d at 5. 
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UPL statute.36 Conversely, the court found, the UPL statute would not 
apply to the services the New York lawyers rendered entirely in New 
York, even though the services constituted legal advice to a California 
client about a California matter.37 
The court evaluated the lawyers’ contacts with California, which 
consisted of entering a fee agreement with a California client providing 
that California law would govern all matters in the representation and 
visiting California several times to meet with the client and others, make 
recommendations, give legal advice, negotiate on behalf of the client, and 
interview potential arbitrators.38 The California Supreme Court concluded 
that these activities constituted the practice of law in California.39 
Consequently, because the New York lawyers were not licensed in 
California, these activities violated the UPL statute.40 Based on its 
conclusion that the defendants had practiced law in California without a 
license, the court held that the defendants were not entitled to recover any 
fees for the unauthorized legal services performed in California.41 
The Birbrower court acknowledged the increasingly heavy burden of 
territorial limitations on a lawyer engaged in representing business clients 
in a mobile society and recognized the client’s interest in being able to 
secure full representation of its interests that cross territorial borders.42 
However, pointing to the UPL statute’s goal of assuring the competence of 
lawyers practicing law in California and the defendants’ “extensive 
activities within California,” the court resisted formulating a more lenient 
 36. Id. at 6. 
 37. Id. at 2. 
 38. Id. at 3. 
 39. Id. at 7. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 10. However, the court held that the defendants may be able to recover for the portion 
of the legal services performed in New York. Id. Thus, it is the place a lawyer practices, not the law 
the lawyer practices, that determines whether the lawyer’s work violates MJP rules. See Servidone 
Constr. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 911 F. Supp. 560, 567 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). So, 
presumably, the New York lawyers in Birbrower were authorized to advise their California client on 
California law as long as both the lawyers and the client were in New York.  
 However, this conclusion does not promote the goal of assuring competence, a goal that is often 
touted as the rationale for strict limitations on MJP. See Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 8; see also supra text 
accompanying note 4. If the Birbrower court’s purpose for not allowing the New York lawyers to 
practice in California is to assure that their California client, which had rights or obligations under 
California law, receive legal services only from lawyers who are presumptively knowledgeable about 
California law, then the practice limitations should focus on promoting that goal by limiting the New 
York lawyers’ practice of California law, not on their practice of law in California. Allowing the New 
York lawyers to recover for advising their client on California law in New York is inconsistent with 
the court’s purported concern with competence. 
 42. 949 P.2d at 6. 
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rule that would have permitted the New York lawyers to fully represent 
their client’s interests in California.43  
The court recognized a narrow exception to the UPL statute’s reach. 
Under this exception, a lawyer who is a member in good standing of the 
bar of another state may appear before a California court if the lawyer 
obtains the permission of the California court before which the matter is 
pending and associates with local counsel.44 This exception did not help 
the New York lawyers who were the defendants in Birbrower since no 
litigation was pending at the time of the representation.45 The court refused 
to recognize an arbitration exception to the reach of the UPL statute, 
noting that it would have been inapplicable in this case (since arbitration 
proceedings had not yet been initiated when the case settled) and that 
whether to recognize such an exception is a matter better left to the 
legislature in any event.46 
The Birbrower opinion was widely criticized for taking such an 
expansive view of unlicensed practice in California47 and created a great 
deal of uncertainty for non-California lawyers representing clients who 
had interests in California.48 As a result, the opinion provided the impetus 
for change by underscoring the need for rules that reflect the 
multijurisdictional nature of modern law practice. 
The ABA appointed the MJP Commission to study the issue and 
propose changes to the ABA Model Rules.49 The MJP Commission 
recognized that because of the increasingly national character of their 
clients’ interests, lawyers commonly engage in MJP.50 In addition, the 
MJP Commission concluded that this increasing need for lawyers to be 
able to “cross state borders to afford clients competent representation” has 
 43. Id. at 8, 10. 
 44. Id. at 6. Although the court recognized additional narrow exceptions, they were not 
applicable in the factual context presented in Birbrower. 
 45. Id. at 3. 
 46. Id. at 8–9. The California Legislature responded to this invitation by enacting a statutory 
exception to UPL regulation for arbitration proceedings. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.4 (West 
2002) (sunsetting on Jan. 1, 2006). In addition, the California Supreme Court subsequently adopted a 
professional conduct rule providing an arbitration exception. See CAL. CT. R. 983.4 (sunsetting on Jan. 
1, 2006). 
 47. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Lessons from the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission: The 
Art of Making Change, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 685, 686–90 (2002). 
 48. Id. at 689; see also William T. Barker, Extrajudicial Practice by Lawyers, 56 BUS. LAW. 
1501 (2002) (discussing cases applying UPL provisions to out-of-state lawyers). 
 49. Stephen Gillers, It’s an MJP World, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2002, at 51 [hereinafter Gillers]. 
 50. MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 10–12. 
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been fueled by technology as well as by the growing complexity of law 
practice.51  
Yet, the MJP Commission recognized, even in the relatively 
predictable context of state court litigation, that the problems of MJP are 
exacerbated by “the lack of uniformity among the pro hac vice provisions 
of different states, unpredictability about how some of the provisions will 
be applied by the courts in individual cases, and, in some cases, the 
provisions’ excessive restrictiveness.”52 Moreover, “of even greater 
concern [to the MJP Commission was] that, outside the context of 
litigation, the reach of the jurisdictional restrictions is vastly uncertain, as 
well as, potentially, far too restrictive.”53 Indeed, the Birbrower case, 
discussed above, illustrates the problems associated with non-litigation 
representation by an out-of-state lawyer.54 Consequently, the MJP 
Commission concluded, “lawyers . . . turn down clients or take other steps 
to avoid or reduce the risk of having to defend against UPL charges or of 
appearing to violate rules of professional conduct.”55 As a result of this 
cautious behavior by lawyers, the overall quality of client representation 
suffers.56 
Against this backdrop, the MJP Commission made specific 
recommendations for amendments to the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, and the ABA House of Delegates approved all of 
the proposed amendments.57 While the old version of Model Rule 5.5 
prohibited a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction where doing so 
violated the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction,58 the new 
version of Rule 5.5 sets forth particular circumstances under which a 
lawyer, licensed and in good standing in another state, may represent 
clients in the host state.59 The goal of the Model Rule 5.5 amendment is to 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. See Birbrower, 949 P.2d 1; see also supra text accompanying notes 18-46. 
 55. MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 24. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Gillers, supra note 49 (describing the approval by the ABA House of Delegates of the 
MJP Commission’s proposals). See also Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441 (2002) 
(summarizing all of the recent amendments to the Model Rules); http://www.aba.net.org/cpr/ 
ethics2K.html (full text of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and recent revisions). 
 58. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (1993). 
 59. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2003). The full text of new Rule 5.5 is as 
follows: 
(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal 
profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so. 
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permit temporary practice in a host state while maintaining a general 
prohibition on systematic and continuous law practice in that state.60 With 
this new rule, the MJP Commission sought to enable out-of-state lawyers 
to protect their clients’ cross-border interests.61 If, as hoped, the new rule 
is adopted by many jurisdictions, it will provide a uniform model that will 
eliminate a great deal of the confusion that resulted from the more general 
old Rule 5.5.62 Indeed, the creation of a uniform approach to MJP—which 
would eliminate much of the confusion and unpredictability that interfered 
with effective client representation—was one of the driving goals of the 
MJP Commission.63 Moreover, the MJP Commission attempted to protect 
the states’ regulatory interests by authorizing MJP only in situations that 
do not pose unacceptable risks to the public interests at stake and by 
including provisions that, to the extent possible, protect the client and the 
state’s disciplinary authority.64 
(b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not: 
(1) except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office or other 
systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or 
(2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice in 
this jurisdiction. 
(c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended 
from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this 
jurisdiction that: 
(1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this 
jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter; 
(2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in 
this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized 
by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized; 
(3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other 
alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services 
arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which 
the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro 
hac vice admission; or 
(4) are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to 
the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice. 
(d) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended 
from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that: 
(1) are provided to the lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates and are not 
services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or 
(2) are services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other law of this 
jurisdiction. 
Id. 
 60. See Gillers, supra note 49, at 52. 
 61. See MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 20-21. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56. 
 64. MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 26. 
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New Model Rule 5.5(a) amends old Rule 5.5 in form only. The basic 
provision remains the same. Subsection (a) prohibits a lawyer from 
engaging in the practice of law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates 
the professional conduct rules in that jurisdiction, and makes clear that a 
lawyer may not assist a lawyer or non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice 
of law.65 
Old Rule 5.5 began and ended with that provision. However, new Rule 
5.5 contains three additional sections, each with provisions that are crucial 
to the MJP Commission’s goals to relax barriers to MJP when there is only 
a minimal risk that the host states’ regulatory interests will be undermined 
and to reinforce host states’ control over lawyers practicing within their 
borders.66 The first of these new sections is Rule 5.5(b), which prohibits an 
out-of-state lawyer from establishing an unauthorized long-term presence 
in the host state.67 In particular, Rule 5.5(b) prohibits an out-of-state 
lawyer from establishing a law office or other continuous and systematic 
law practice in the host state.68 In addition, Rule 5.5(b) prohibits an out-of-
state lawyer from representing to prospective clients and others that the 
lawyer is admitted to practice law in the host state.69  
The MJP Commission made, and the ABA adopted, a separate 
recommendation regarding “admission on motion,” designed to 
compliment Rule 5.5(b)’s prohibition on setting up an ongoing unlicensed 
practice within a host state by easing the bar admission process for 
lawyers who want to permanently relocate their practices.70 Modeled after 
similar provisions already in effect in many states, the recommendation for 
admission on motion provides that a lawyer who is admitted to practice 
and in good professional standing in another state and has been engaged in 
active practice for five of the seven years immediately before the motion 
for admission is made, may be admitted without a bar examination as long 
as the lawyer passes the character and fitness component of the new state’s 
bar admission process.71 This recommendation represents a recognition 
that the process set up for licensing new law school graduates is 
unnecessarily onerous when applied to lawyers who are already licensed 
and in good standing in other states and have been practicing for a 
 65. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a) (2003). 
 66. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2003). 
 67. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b) (2003). 
 68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b)(1) (2003). 
 69. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b)(2) (2003). 
 70. See MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 47 (Recommendation 7). 
 71. MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 47; see also MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra 
note 8, at 71 n.51 (citing many states’ rules providing for admission on motion).  
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significant number of years.72 In particular, the MJP Commission found 
that “[j]urisdictional restrictions [on admission of licensed lawyers] 
impede national mobility, because in many cases the process for admitting 
lawyers to practice law in a new jurisdiction is lengthy, expensive, and 
burdensome.”73  
Taken together, new Rule 5.5(b) and the admission on motion 
recommendation tell out-of-state lawyers that if they want to permanently 
relocate their practices to the host state, they must seek admission to the 
state’s bar; the purpose of Rule 5.5 is to protect temporary—not 
permanent—MJP. In addition, the message to states is that they ought to 
permit temporary practice by licensed lawyers endeavoring to provide 
competent and complete legal services to their clients, and that states 
ought to facilitate lawyer mobility by relaxing their bar admission 
procedures for experienced lawyers who are already licensed and in good 
standing in other states. 
New Rule 5.5(c) contains provisions that will permit a lawyer, licensed 
and in good standing in another state, to practice law on a temporary basis 
in the host state under any of the following four circumstances: (1) when 
the out-of-state lawyer affiliates with a lawyer who is licensed in the host 
state and who actively participates in the representation; (2) when the out-
of-state lawyer is preparing for pending or potential litigation in the host 
state or another state, and the out-of-state lawyer is admitted to appear in 
the proceedings or reasonably expects to appear in the proceedings; (3) 
when the out-of-state lawyer’s work in the host state is related to a 
pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute 
resolution (“ADR”) proceeding in the host state, and the services 
reasonably relate to the out-of-state lawyer’s home state practice; and (4) 
when the work in the host state arises out of the out-of-state lawyer’s 
home state practice, including, for example, work on a matter with a 
significant connection to the home state, work in the lawyer’s practice 
concentration, or work for an in-house lawyer’s employer.74 
In particular, Rule 5.5(c)(1) provides that an out-of-state lawyer may, 
on a temporary basis, provide legal services that “are undertaken in 
association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in [the host] 
jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter.”75 This provision 
 72. See MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 50. 
 73. Id. 
 74. RHODE & HAZARD, supra note 14, at 182; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c) 
(2003). See also Gillers, supra note 49, at 52.  
 75. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(1) (2003). 
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requires that the local counsel share actual responsibility for the 
representation; pro forma involvement is insufficient to shield the out-of-
state lawyer from UPL regulation under this provision.76 The reason for 
requiring active participation by the local lawyer is to protect the host 
state’s interests in ensuring competent representation and protecting the 
judicial system.77 The local counsel’s active participation provides 
sufficient assurance that the state’s interests are protected because the local 
lawyer can supervise the out-of-state lawyer’s performance and is 
answerable to the state disciplinary authority.78  
This provision facilitates more effective client representation in several 
ways. First, it enables a client who has already retained local counsel to 
engage expert counsel who might not be admitted in the host state. Thus, 
local counsel and the client can benefit from the consultation with an 
expert on a particular legal issue without concerns about the expert 
lawyer’s participation being thwarted by the host state’s strict UPL 
restrictions. Second, this provision enables a client who has an existing 
relationship with an out-of-state lawyer to obtain the expertise of local 
counsel without having to lose the benefit of ongoing consultation with the 
out-of-state lawyer. The out-of-state lawyer may remain involved with the 
client’s representation and provide advice regarding the quality of the local 
representation. In addition, this provision removes MJP barriers for 
lawyers in firms that have offices in multiple states. For example, suppose 
a lawyer who is licensed in Texas works for a law firm with offices in 
Texas and New York. The Texas lawyer could temporarily79 practice in 
the New York office as long as one of the firm’s New York lawyers is 
actively involved in the representation.80 
Model Rule 5.5(c)(2) provides that an out-of-state lawyer may, on a 
temporary basis, provide legal services that “are in or reasonably related to 
a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another 
jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized 
 76. See MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 22. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. The Rule is not intended to authorize out-of-state lawyers being “rotated” through a firm’s 
offices located in different states. Similarly, a lawyer who “moves” permanently to the firm’s office in 
another state is not protected by this rule during the period the lawyer is awaiting bar results or other 
aspects of the bar admission procedures to become finalized. See MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra 
note 8, at 23, 69 n.36. Separate state UPL rules might, however, permit such activities. See, e.g., 
Dietrich Corp. v. King Resources Co., 596 F.2d 422, 426 (10th Cir. 1979); Shapiro v. Steinberg, 440 
N.W.2d 9, 11 (Mich. App. Ct. 1989); In re Jackman, 761 A.2d 1103, 1107 (N.J. 2000); New York 
County Lawyers’ Association Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion 682 (1990). 
 80. See MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 22. 
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by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be 
so authorized.”81 This provision does not replace local pro hac vice 
admission requirements for appearing before a court, but it allows the out-
of-state lawyer to provide services that are ancillary to pending or 
prospective litigation.82  
This subsection permits temporary practice in a host state under two 
circumstances. First, it authorizes an out-of-state lawyer’s services in the 
host state that are in anticipation of litigation that the lawyer expects to be 
filed in the lawyer’s home state. For example, prior to filing suit, the 
lawyer might need to go into other states to investigate, gather evidence, 
interview witnesses, review documents, or negotiate. 
Second, subsection 5.5(c)(2) permits legal services that are ancillary to 
litigation that is already pending either in the lawyer’s home state or in a 
state where the lawyer has been or reasonably expects to be admitted pro 
hac vice to participate in the litigation. Thus, a lawyer who is properly 
representing a client in litigation may travel outside the state where 
litigation is pending in order to gather evidence, take or defend 
depositions, or conduct settlement negotiations.  
Subsection 5.5(c)(2) provides the flexibility necessary for the lawyer to 
do all legal work necessary—wherever that work arises—to fully represent 
the client’s interests in pending or prospective litigation. This subsection 
strikes an appropriate balance between the host states’ interests and the 
needs of lawyers to have the flexibility necessary to fully and efficiently 
represent their clients’ interests in litigation. It would be expensive and 
inefficient to require lawyers to hire local counsel every time they had to 
travel across state lines to do work ancillary to litigation.83 This is 
especially true in the context of preliminary work done in anticipation of 
litigation that has not yet been filed.84 Moreover, the host state’s regulatory 
interest is not seriously threatened by permitting cross-border legal work 
that is ancillary to pending litigation because the court in which the 
litigation is pending is empowered to regulate the conduct of the lawyers 
appearing in proceedings before it.85 Nor is the host state’s regulatory 
 81. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(2) (2003). 
 82. MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 25. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission (2002), reprinted in MJP Comm’n Final Report, 
supra note 8, at 39 (requiring that an out-of-state lawyer seeking pro hac vice admission submit to the 
authority of the state disciplinary authority for all conduct related to the proceeding); MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2003) (enhancing the power of the court in which litigation is pending to 
supervise and regulate the professional conduct of the lawyers appearing). 
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interest seriously threatened by permitting cross-border work that is 
ancillary to anticipated litigation. Under Rule 8.5, the licensing state 
retains power to discipline a lawyer who goes out of state to do work in 
anticipation of litigation.86 In addition, under amended Rule 8.5, the host 
state has regulatory power over an out-of-state lawyer performing legal 
services in that state in anticipation of litigation.87 Thus, even if a suit 
ultimately is not filed, the host state’s regulatory interests are still 
protected. 
To compliment new Rule 5.5(c)(2), the ABA also adopted a Model 
Rule on pro hac vice admission.88 The purpose of this Rule is to create 
formality, uniformity, and predictability in both the procedures and the 
standards for pro hac vice admission, and to promote the policy that 
clients should generally be able to have counsel of their choice.89 
Typically, courts freely grant pro hac vice admission.90 However, few 
jurisdictions have concrete procedural rules for applying for or challenging 
applications for pro hac vice admission, or for revoking pro hac vice 
admission once granted, or formal substantive standards to guide a court 
or agency in exercising its discretion to grant or deny an application.91 The 
ABA MJP Commission concluded that lawyers and clients would benefit 
from increased uniformity and predictability in both the procedures and 
standards for pro hac vice admission.92  
Moreover, the MJP Commission concluded that clients are best served 
by rules that encourage liberal pro hac vice admission.93 This enables a 
client to establish an ongoing relationship with a lawyer whom the client 
trusts, and it also enables a client to select a lawyer who has a particular 
expertise irrespective of the lawyer’s home state. This is particularly 
 86. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2003) (providing that “[a] lawyer admitted 
to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of 
where the lawyer’s conduct occurs”). 
 87. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2003) (providing that “[a] lawyer not 
admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer 
provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction”). 
 88. See Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission, reprinted in MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra 
note 8, at 39. 
 89. MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 44. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. Indeed, the ABA Section of Litigation reported that “‘generally the pro hac vice 
procedure is an adequate method for oversight of attorneys who appear and render legal services in 
pending litigation outside the states where licensed,’ but that ‘[a] more uniform pro hac vice procedure 
. . . would be strongly preferable to the disparate requirements now in place.’” Id. (quoting ABA 
Section of Litigation, Preliminary Position Statement on Multi-jurisdictional Practice, 35 (June 2001), 
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp-comm_sl.html). 
 92. MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 44. 
 93. Id. 
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appropriate when the litigation is pending in federal court and involves 
federal law that does not implicate state law peculiarities. However, in 
drafting the Rule, the MJP Commission was mindful that the policy 
favoring liberal pro hac vice admission must be balanced against the host 
state’s regulatory interests: protection of the client and the judicial 
system.94 
The Model Rule on pro hac vice admission accomplishes this balance 
through four important provisions. First, the Rule sets out specific 
procedures for seeking or objecting to pro hac vice admission.95 Second, 
the Rule encourages liberal pro hac vice admission by providing that a 
court or agency should, in its discretion, grant admission unless the 
admission might be detrimental to the prompt, fair, and efficient 
administration of justice or to the legitimate interests of the parties other 
than the client, the client is at risk of inadequate representation and is 
unable to appreciate the risk, or the out-of-state lawyer seeking admission 
pro hac vice has practiced in the host state so frequently as to constitute 
regular practice in the state.96 Third, the Rule formally establishes the host 
state’s regulatory power over the out-of-state lawyer by providing that, by 
applying for pro hac vice admission, the out-of-state lawyer submits to the 
host state’s disciplinary authority.97 Fourth, the Rule seeks to protect the 
client from the out-of-state lawyer’s incompetence by requiring that an in-
state lawyer serve as counsel of record and actively participate in the 
representation.98 
Taken together, Rule 5.5(c)(2) and the Model Rule on pro hac vice 
admission enable a lawyer to fully represent a client’s litigation interests, 
even when those interests require litigation to be commenced or defended 
in another state, and ensure that the state’s regulatory interests are 
protected.  
Model Rule 5.5(c)(3) permits an out-of-state lawyer to temporarily 
provide legal services that fit within the following category: 
[The services] are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential 
arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution 
proceeding in [the host state] or another [state], if the services arise 
out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a 
 94. Id. at 44-45. 
 95. Id. at 39-43. 
 96. Id. at 40. 
 97. Id. at 41. 
 98. Id. at 45. 
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jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not 
services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission.99  
This provision is designed to enable an out-of-state lawyer to 
participate freely in ADR proceedings that are related to the lawyer’s 
home state practice except when the particular ADR proceeding requires 
pro hac vice admission.100 This broad authority to engage in ADR 
proceedings recognizes that the location of ADR proceedings frequently is 
based on convenience and is unrelated to the applicable law.101 Clients are 
not at risk of receiving incompetent representation from out-of-state 
lawyers resulting from their lack of expertise in the host state’s law and 
procedure since such expertise is usually not necessary in ADR 
proceedings.102 Thus, allowing broad participation in ADR proceedings by 
out-of-state lawyers does not implicate the host state’s regulatory interests. 
Moreover, since effective ADR requires client cooperation, clients have a 
significant interest in being represented by counsel of their choice in ADR 
proceedings.103 This means unnecessary restrictions on lawyers’ ability to 
represent their clients in ADR proceedings should be eliminated. In those 
relatively rare circumstances where local law expertise is required, pro hac 
vice admission ought to be required to prevent the representation without 
adequate client safeguards, such as requiring local counsel. 
Model Rule 5.5(c)(4) authorizes an out-of-state lawyer to provide 
temporary legal services in the host state that “arise out of or are 
reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in” the lawyer’s home state.104 
This provision is intended to permit “legal services provided by the lawyer 
outside the lawyer’s state of admission that are related to the lawyer’s 
practice in the home state,” including “transactional representation, 
counseling, and other non-litigation work.”105 The MJP Commission’s 
final report stated: 
[F]or this provision to apply, the lawyer’s work in the host state 
must arise out of or be reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in 
the home state, so that as a matter of efficiency or for other reasons, 
 99. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(3) (2003). 
 100. Of course, the lawyer could seek pro hac vice admission pursuant to the Model Rule on Pro 
Hac Vice Admission (or the procedure in place in the location or tribunal in which the ADR 
proceeding is pending). See Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission, reprinted in MJP Comm’n Final 
Report, supra note 8, at 44. 
 101. MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 24. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. 
 104. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(3) (2003). 
 
 105. MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 25. 
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the client’s interest in retaining the lawyer should be respected. For 
example, if a corporate client is seeking legal advice about its 
environmental liability or about its employment relations in each of 
the twenty states in which it has plants, it is likely to be 
unnecessarily costly and inefficient for the client to retain twenty 
different lawyers. Likewise, if a corporate client is seeking to open a 
retail store in each of twenty states, the client may be best served by 
retaining a single lawyer to assist it in coordinating its efforts. On 
the other hand, work for an out-of-state client with whom the 
lawyer has no prior professional relationship and for whom the 
lawyer is performing no other work ordinarily will not have the 
requisite relationship to the lawyer’s practice where the matter 
involves a body of law in which the lawyer does not have special 
expertise. In the context of determining whether work performed 
outside the lawyer’s home state is reasonably related to the lawyer’s 
practice in the home state, as is true in the many other legal contexts 
in which a “reasonableness” standard is employed, some judgment 
must be exercised.106 
This provision applies in three specific contexts. First, the provision 
permits legal services that are ancillary to a particular matter in the 
lawyer’s home state.107 This enables a lawyer to travel temporarily into 
another state, for example, to negotiate on behalf of a home state-client.108 
Second, this provision permits a lawyer to work on an out-of-state matter 
when it is related to an in-state matter that the lawyer is working on for the 
same client.109 This recognizes the client’s interest in being able to retain 
one lawyer or law firm to provide complete legal representation of all the 
client’s interests, wherever implicated.110 In other words, this provision 
facilitates long-term lawyer-client relationships.  
Third, subsection 5.5(c)(4) allows a lawyer to provide, on a temporary 
basis, out-of-state legal services in matters within the lawyer’s special 
expertise.111 This provision is in response to comments the MJP 
Commission received from various constituencies supporting rules that 
would permit free cross-border practice by lawyers with particular 
expertise to enable these lawyers to provide more complete client 
 106. Id. at 26. 
 107. Id. at 25. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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representation.112 For example, a client might want to retain a particular 
lawyer because of that lawyer’s expertise in federal tax law or antitrust 
law. Rule 5.5(c)(4) enables the client to do this without regard to where 
the lawyer is licensed.113 This is particularly appropriate for lawyers 
practicing federal law.114 Indeed, the MJP Commission recognized that 
“many lawyers who specialize in federal law currently practice nationally, 
without regard to jurisdictional restrictions, which are unenforced.”115 
Thus, Rule 5.5(c)(4) brings the Model Rules in line with the reality of 
current practice. 
Allowing MJP in accordance with Rule 5.5(c)(4) does not pose a 
significant threat to the state’s regulatory interests because the Rule 
requires that the practice in the host state be temporary and that the 
representation be related to either an on-going relationship with a client or 
a representation of a client in another state. The state’s regulatory interests 
are protected because the lawyer has an interest in maintaining client 
confidence by providing competent legal services, and the home state 
retains disciplinary authority over the lawyer.116 
The next new section, Model Rule 5.5(d), contains two specific 
provisions. First, subsection 5.5(d)(1) permits an out-of-state lawyer to 
provide legal services that “are provided to the lawyer’s employer or its 
organizational affiliates and are not services for which the [host state] 
requires pro hac vice admission.”117 This provision enables in-house 
counsel and government lawyers to provide legal services outside the state 
in which they are licensed except when the particular services require pro 
hac vice admission, such as in the context of litigation.118 Unlike Model 
Rule 5.5(c), Rule 5.5(d) does not limit the MJP authorization to temporary 
 112. See id. at 26, 69 n.41 & 42. For example, the ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law 
stated that “‘our expertise in intellectual property law and in the subject matter, often combined with 
knowledge of a client’s business, is the overriding reason our clients retain us . . . [O]ur clients . . . 
place a greater value on our expertise than on our location. . . . Such clients are seeking uniform, well-
informed and efficiently rendered advice regardless of state lines, and they do not want to hire multiple 
lawyers for multiple states.’” Id. at 26, 69 n.41 (quoting ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law, 
Memorandum to the ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice 2 (Feb. 2, 2001), at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp-comm_silp.html). 
 113. See MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 25–26. 
 114. Id. at 26, 70 n.42 (citing various comments supporting “a provision allowing lawyers to 
practice federal law in jurisdictions where they are not licensed”). The MJP Commission noted, 
however, that this provision would also permit a client to retain an expert in the home state law if that 
state’s law governs the matter in the host state. Id. at 26. 
 115. Id. at 26. 
 116. Id. at 25. 
 117. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(d)(1) (2003). 
 118. See MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 27. 
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work in the host state. Indeed, the MJP Commission stated that this 
“provision would allow an out-of-state lawyer to work permanently from 
the office of a corporate, government or other organizational employer and 
that “[t]his [broad MJP authorization] is consistent with the explicit 
understanding in many jurisdictions.”119  
This provision advances the interests of corporations that seek to 
employ in-house lawyers to represent the corporation on all legal matters, 
wherever they might arise.120 In addition, the state’s regulatory interests 
are not seriously threatened by allowing broad in-house MJP practice 
because, as the MJP Commission observed, “an in-house lawyer is ‘under 
the constant scrutiny of his or her employer.’”121 
Second, subsection 5.5(d)(2) permits an out-of-state lawyer to provide 
legal services that are authorized by federal law or the law of the host 
jurisdiction.122 This provision makes clear that federal prosecutors, federal 
patent attorneys, and others may practice in states where they are not 
licensed because they are authorized to do so by federal law.123 In 
addition, some states permit foreign lawyers to serve as consultants, and 
these lawyers would be covered by subsection 5.5(d)(2) as well.124 
Presumably, the law which provides the authorization to practice in the 
host states, and which implicates Rule 5.5(d)(2), reflects the proper 
balance between the host state’s regulatory interests and the need to permit 
MJP. Thus, Rule 5.5(d)(2) imposes no additional burden on the host 
state’s regulatory interests than that which has already resulted from law 
authorizing the out-of-state lawyer to practice in the host state. 
III. CHOICE OF LAW IN MJP: MODEL RULE 8.5 
The second issue that arises when an out-of-state lawyer practices in a 
host jurisdiction is the question of what ethical rules the out-of-state 
lawyer is bound to follow while carrying out the work in the host 
jurisdiction. Model Rule 8.5 is designed to address this issue.125 Along 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. at 27 (“The organization’s interest in being provided legal assistance in an efficient, 
cost-effective and competent manner by a lawyer in whom it reposes confidence is furthered by 
permitting an organization to employ a lawyer to assist it with recurring matters.”). 
 121. See id. at 27 (quoting California Supreme Court Advisory Task Force on Multijurisdictional 
Practice, Final Report and Recommendations 28 (Jan. 7, 2002), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/ 
comm2_csca.pdf). 
 122. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(d)(2) (2003). 
 123. MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 27. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2003). 
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with Rule 5.5, Rule 8.5 was amended in accordance with the MJP 
Commission’s recommendations to strengthen the ability of host states to 
discipline out-of-state lawyers practicing there under new Rule 5.5.126  
Old Rule 8.5(a), still the law in most jurisdictions, provides that “[a] 
lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary 
authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct 
occurs. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this 
jurisdiction and another jurisdiction where the lawyer is admitted for the 
same conduct.”127 Thus, old Rule 8.5(a) merely established the home 
state’s authority to discipline its own lawyers. In addition, old Rule 8.5(b) 
set out choice-of-law principles to be applied in deciding what 
jurisdiction’s professional conduct rules to apply.128 Despite the seemingly 
straightforward provisions of old Rule 8.5, considerable confusion existed 
over whether lawyers practicing away from their home state might be 
subject to the conflicting obligations of multiple jurisdictions’ ethical 
rules.129  
This issue is particularly complicated when the out-of-state lawyer is 
practicing in the federal courts because the state ethical rules do not bind 
federal courts.130 Instead, each federal court adopts local rules defining 
 126. Id. 
 127. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (1993). 
 128. MODEL RULES OF PROF’S CONDUCT R. 8.5 (1993). The full text of old Model Rule 8.5 
provides: 
(a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the 
disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs. A 
lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another 
jurisdiction where the lawyer is admitted for the same conduct. 
(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules 
of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows: 
 (1) for conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court before which a lawyer has 
been admitted to practice (either generally or for purposes of that proceeding), the rules to be 
applied shall be the rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits, unless the rules of the 
court provide otherwise; and  
 (2) for any other conduct, 
  (i) if the lawyer is licensed to practice only in this jurisdiction, the rules to be applied 
shall be the rules of this jurisdiction, and  
  (ii) if the lawyer is licensed to practice in this and another jurisdiction, the rules to be 
applied shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally 
practices; provided, however, that if particular conduct clearly has its predominant effect in 
another jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed to practice, the rules of that jurisdiction 
shall be applied to that conduct. 
 129. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, RULE 8.5 (West 2003) 
(recognizing that lawyers are “potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional conduct 
which impose different obligations”). 
 
 130. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 n.6 (1985). At least one court has expressly held that the 
Erie doctrine does not compel the federal courts to permit particular action by an attorney that would 
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what ethical rules are to be followed by lawyers practicing in that court.131 
Although some federal courts have local rules providing that the ethical 
rules of the state in which the federal court sits will be binding on lawyers 
practicing before that court, others have local rules establishing different 
ethical standards than those in effect in the state in which the federal court 
sits.132 As a result, there is often considerable confusion about what ethical 
rules are applicable to regulate an out-of-state lawyer’s conduct when 
practicing in a federal court. 
The problem of regulating an out-of-state lawyer practicing in a federal 
court is illustrated by a 1995 case from the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey: In re Prudential Insurance Company of 
America Sales Practices Litigation.133 In Prudential, various plaintiffs, as 
individuals and on behalf of purported classes, sued Prudential Insurance 
in various federal courts across the country.134 The Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation centralized the cases for consolidated pretrial 
proceedings135 in the United States District Court for the District of New 
be allowed by the state courts. Unified Sewerage v. Jelco, 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981). Other federal 
courts have implicitly reached this same conclusion by simply applying, even in diversity actions, their 
own ethical rules that diverge from the state ethical rules. See, e.g., Figueroa-Olmo v. Westinghouse 
Electric Corp., 616 F. Supp. 1445, 1449-50 (D.P.R. 1985). 
 131. A 1995 study by the Subcommittee on Rules of Attorney Conduct determined that 50 federal 
districts had adopted state rules based on, but not identical to, the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct or Model Code of Professional Responsibility; 11 districts had not adopted any rule; ten 
districts had adopted both the ABA Model Rules and the state’s rules; two of California’s four federal 
districts had adopted the California Rules of Professional Conduct and the other two had adopted both 
the state rules and the ABA Model Code; and the Northern District of Illinois adopted its own version 
of the ABA Model Rules, which is distinct from both the ABA Model Rules and the Illinois rules. 
Daniel R. Coquillette, Report on Local Rules Regulating Attorney Conduct in the Federal Courts (July 
5, 1995), reprinted in Working Papers of the Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
Special Studies of Federal Rules Governing Attorney Conduct 3-6 (1997). 
 132. See id. See also Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(noting that some judges in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York have adopted the Model 
Rules even if they conflict with New York’s ethical rules); McCallum v. CSX Transp., Inc., 149 
F.R.D. 104, 108 (N.D.N.C. 1993) (“[E]ven when a federal court utilizes state ethics rules, it cannot 
abdicate to the state’s view of what constitutes professional conduct, even in diversity cases.”). 
 133. 911 F. Supp. 148 (D.N.J. 1995). 
 134. The various claims related to allegations by customers that Prudential had defrauded them by 
misrepresenting the nature and potential cost of various insurance products, and by former Prudential 
sales agents that Prudential wrongfully terminated their employment when they refused to participate 
in Prudential’s allegedly fraudulent practices. Prudential, 911 F. Supp. at 150. 
 135. Consolidation was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Thus, under Rule 1.4 of the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, the parties’ original attorneys were permitted to continue 
representing their clients without obtaining local counsel or pro hac vice admission. Rule 1.4 provides 
as follows: “Every member in good standing of the Bar of any district court of the United States is 
entitled without condition to practice before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Any 
attorney of record in any action transferred under [28 U.S.C. § 1407] may continue to represent his 
client in any district court of the United States to which such action is transferred. Parties to any action 
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Jersey. Prudential sought to limit the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ ex parte contact 
with its present and former employees.136 The question before the district 
court was which ethical rules would be applied to determine the 
permissible limits of plaintiffs’ lawyers’ contact with Prudential’s past and 
present employees.137  
The district court had adopted a local rule providing that parties 
practicing before it must comply with the New Jersey Rules of 
Professional Conduct.138 The lawyers representing the plaintiffs and 
purported class members contended that this local rule required that their 
professional conduct was subject to regulation solely by the New Jersey 
Rules of Professional Conduct, as interpreted by the New Jersey courts.139 
However, Prudential argued that, under the local rule, each attorney 
involved in the case was subject to the ethical rules in effect in multiple 
jurisdictions, including the jurisdiction where the district court sat (New 
Jersey), the jurisdiction where the lawyer’s law firm’s main office was 
located, each jurisdiction where the lawyer principally practiced (and, 
presumably, was licensed), each jurisdiction where the lawyer conducted 
an interview, and any jurisdiction where the case for which the interview 
was conducted ultimately may be tried.140 Had the district court adopted 
this argument, a single interview could be subject to the ethical rules of at 
least five jurisdictions. For example, the district court noted, “an attorney 
from [a New York firm’s] California office could conduct an interview in 
Maryland related to a case which might ultimately be tried in Tennessee. 
For purposes of that interview alone, that attorney would be subject to the 
rules of New Jersey, New York, California, . . . Maryland, and 
Tennessee.”141 The district court concluded that “[s]uch a result is highly 
impractical and virtually unenforceable in a litigation of national scope 
such as this one.”142 
transferred under [28 U.S.C. § 1407] are not required to obtain local counsel in the district to which 
such action is transferred.” J.P.M.L. R. 4.1. 
 136. 911 F. Supp. at 150. 
 137. Id. at 150-51.  
 138. Specifically, the local rule provided as follows: “The Rules of Professional Conduct of the 
American Bar Association as revised by the New Jersey Supreme Court shall govern the conduct of 
the members of the bar admitted to practice in this Court, subject to such modifications as may be 
required or permitted by federal statute, regulation, court rule or decision of law.” D. N.J. GEN. R. 6A.  
 139. One group of plaintiffs argued that the district court reject General Rule 6A entirely as being 
inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s broad discovery provisions. The district court 
rejected this argument without much discussion, finding that the situation presented was not 
sufficiently “extraordinary to justify disregarding the rule entirely.” Prudential, 911 F. Supp. at 151. 
 140. 911 F. Supp. at 150-51. 
 141. Id. at 151 n.3. 
 142. Id. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss3/2
p737 Fountaine book pages.doc2/4/2004   5:57 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2003] HAVE LICENSE, WILL TRAVEL 759 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the court recognized that the anomalous result of Prudential’s 
proposed rule would be improperly unwieldy, the court was left without 
firm guidance from New Jersey’s rules. At the time the motion was before 
the district court, New Jersey’s version of Model Rule 8.5 provided that 
“[a] lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the 
disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction although engaged in practice 
elsewhere.”143 Obviously, this rule did not answer the question about 
which ethical rules governed an out-of-state lawyer who was engaged in 
practice in New Jersey, and no New Jersey court had yet spoken on the 
issue.144 The focus of the New Jersey rule was on maintaining disciplinary 
control over New Jersey lawyers, wherever they might be practicing, 
rather than on exerting disciplinary control over non-New Jersey lawyers 
who might be found practicing in New Jersey. 
At the time the motion was pending before the district court (in 1995), 
however, the ABA had recently adopted its 1993 amendment to Model 
Rule 8.5.145 Amended Model Rule 8.5(b)(1) provided as follows:  
In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the 
rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows: (1) 
for conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court before which 
a lawyer has been admitted to practice (either generally or for 
purposes of that proceeding), the rules to be applied shall be the 
rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits, unless the rules of 
the court provide otherwise. . . .146  
This amended Rule 8.5 provided sufficient guidance to enable the district 
court to resolve the issue without the unwieldy result Prudential urged.  
However, New Jersey had not yet considered and adopted or rejected 
the ABA amendment, and the district court’s local rule required it to 
follow New Jersey law.147 Nevertheless, the district court decided to adopt 
and apply amended Rule 8.5, reasoning that it had the power, under its 
local rule, to predict what New Jersey would do.148 Accordingly, the 
district court predicted, without discussion, that New Jersey would adopt 
 143. Id. at 151. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Thus, this case illustrates the litigation-inducing confusion that results from the ABA’s 
approval of amendments before the states have had an opportunity to consider and either accept or 
reject them. 
 146. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (1993). 
 147. 911 F. Supp. at 151. 
 148. 911 F. Supp. at 151 (citing D.N.J. GEN. R. 6A). 
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the amended Rule.149 Applying this Rule, the district court concluded that 
it would apply New Jersey’s ethical rules—and only New Jersey’s ethical 
rules—to regulate the conduct of all the attorneys participating in the 
case.150 The court noted, however, that another jurisdiction could “exercise 
concurrent control over the members of its bar.”151 Thus, the potential for 
a lawyer to be subject to the ethical rules of multiple jurisdictions 
persisted. 
Seeking to enhance predictability and uniformity and to strengthen 
Rule 8.5 so host states could more effectively regulate out-of-state 
lawyers, the MJP Commission proposed an amendment to Rule 8.5 that 
accomplished two things.152 First, the amendment gives the host state 
disciplinary authority over any lawyer who performs or offers to perform 
services in the host state.153 Specifically, the amendment to Rule 8.5(a) 
adds the following provision: “A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is 
also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer 
provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction.”154 In 
addition, although under the old version of the rule, the lawyer had to be 
present within the host state to be disciplined,155 under the new rule, the 
host state may discipline lawyers who are outside the jurisdiction.156 This 
provision establishes the power of the host state to discipline out-of-state 
lawyers practicing pursuant to Rule 5.5 or a complementary provision.157 
Second, the amendment to Rule 8.5(b) is designed to resolve conflicts 
about which jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct are applicable to 
avoid subjecting a lawyer to multiple jurisdictions’ rules that might 
impose conflicting obligations.158 Significantly, under the amended Rule 
8.5(b), a lawyer’s conduct is subject to regulation under only one set of 
rules.159 The provision clarifies that the ethical rules of the state in which a 
tribunal sits will apply to conduct relating to matters pending before that 
tribunal.160 For work unrelated to a matter pending before a tribunal, the 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Gillers, supra note 49, at 52. 
 153. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (2003). 
 154. Id. 
 155. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (1993). 
 156. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (2003) & cmt. 1 (2003). 
 157. Id. 
 158. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b) & cmt. 3 (2003). 
 159. Id. 
 
 160. Amended Model Rule 8.5(b)(1) (2003) provides as follows: “In any exercise of the 
disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be . . . 
(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in 
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amendment makes the lawyer subject to the rules of the jurisdiction in 
which the conduct occurred or in which the conduct had its predominant 
effect.161 In addition, the amended rule contains a provision that protects 
lawyers whose “conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which 
the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s 
conduct will occur.”162 This provision is intended to protect a lawyer 
whose practice under Rule 5.5 and the complementary provisions results 
in significant contacts with multiple states.163 
In addition, to compliment the provisions of Rule 8.5, an amendment to 
the reciprocal discipline rules eliminates the opportunity for a lawyer to 
evade discipline by leaving the host state.164 Although some exceptions 
exist, generally, the lawyer’s home state is required, under the amendment, 
to honor the sanction issued by the host state’s disciplinary proceeding.165 
Taken together, amended Rule 8.5 and reciprocal discipline rules 
establish the disciplinary authority of the host state, thus providing 
sufficient protection of the host state’s regulatory interests in light of the 
more liberal MJP authorization provided in Rule 5.5 and the rules that 
compliment it. 
IV. THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF DISUNIFORMITY 
The ABA’s new MJP provisions recognize the realities of modern MJP 
and establish clear rules for when an out-of-state lawyer may practice in a 
host state. In so doing, the new rules accommodate the competing interests 
of lawyers to fully represent their clients’ interests and of the state to 
which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(1) (2003).  
 161. Amended Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) (2003) provides as follows:  
In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional 
conduct to be applied shall be . . . (2) for [conduct not in connection with a matter pending 
before a tribunal], the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct occurred, or, if 
the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction 
shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer’s 
conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the 
predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will occur. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2) (2003). 
 162. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2) (2003). 
 163. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5, cmt. 5 (2003). 
 164. ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 22, Reciprocal Discipline and 
Reciprocal Disability Inactive Status (2002), referenced in MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 
35. 
 165. Id. 
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protect clients and the judicial system from out-of-state lawyers’ unethical 
conduct. 
However, the MJP Commission did not achieve one of its central goals 
in amending the Model Rules: uniformity to enhance predictability.166 The 
problem with the great state-to-state variation in MJP regulation and 
enforcement that exists under the current Rules is that a lawyer is unable 
effectively to predict the extent to which he or she will be able to fully 
represent the client’s multi-state interests at the time of accepting a 
representation. This unpredictability leads to two possible problematic 
results: either the lawyer rejects full representation out of an abundance of 
caution, or the lawyer accepts the representation in the face of potential 
violation of UPL regulations. Both of these results are unacceptable 
because both pose risks to full, vigorous representation of the client’s 
interests.  
In order to protect and promote full representation of clients’ interests, 
it is crucial that lawyers be able to predict the limits of their lawful 
practice. This predictability may only be achieved if MJP rules are roughly 
uniform from one state to another. This is because, at the time of accepting 
a representation, a lawyer is often unable to predict with absolute certainty 
where the representation will require the lawyer to practice. At the time of 
accepting a representation, a lawyer might not even know who all the 
adverse-interest holders will be, much less in which states they will be 
found. In addition, during the course of a representation thought to be 
limited to one state, the lawyer might find that the client’s interests are 
impacted in another state. Thus, uniformity of MJP regulation is crucial to 
enhance predictability for lawyers attempting to comply with the rules 
while fully representing their clients.  
However, disuniformity persists under the ABA’s new MJP regulatory 
scheme because of the lack of a uniform, national approach. The ABA’s 
amendments were premised on the MJP Commission’s recommendation 
that states continue to maintain independent regulatory control over the 
practice of law.167 However, this premise ensures disuniformity and 
impairs predictability. Alternatives to amended Rules 5.5 and 8.5 are 
under consideration and have been and will continue to be adopted in 
 166. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2003); see also Patricia Manson, ABA 
Rejects National Law License, 147 Chicago Daily Law Bulletin (Aug. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Manson]. 
 167. See MJP Comm’n Final Report, supra note 8, at 13. The MJP Commission’s first 
recommendation, as adopted by the ABA, is that “[t]he American Bar Association affirms its support 
for the principle of state judicial regulation of the practice of law.” Id. 
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some states.168 For example, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS permits legal work that “arise[s] out of or [is] 
otherwise related to” the lawyer’s home state practice.169 Disuniformity 
will remain to the extent that numerous states adopt versions of the Model 
Rules that vary from the precise ABA provisions. Without a uniform, 
national approach to the problem of MJP, uniformity and predictability 
will not be achieved, and, consequently, client representation will suffer. 
The concept of uniformity of ethical standards has most often been 
considered from a vertical-parity perspective in consideration of the 
hardships faced by federal prosecutors170 who are licensed by the state and 
thus obligated to follow state ethical standards, but who practice in the 
federal courts, which might have adopted different standards from those in 
effect in the state where the federal court sits.171  
The case for a horizontally and vertically uniform system of MJP 
regulation is even more compelling than is the case for vertically uniform 
regulation of federal prosecutors. Significantly, federal prosecutors work 
within two discrete systems—one state system and one federal system—
requiring them to comply with and resolve conflicts between these two 
systems.172 However, in the broader MJP context, a lawyer might not even 
 168. See Robert Schuwerk & Lillian B. Hardwick, 48 TEX. PRAC., TEX. LAWYER & JUD. ETHICS 
§ 10.05 (2002 ed.); Melissa Nann, Proposed Pennsylvania Rule Would Permit Multijurisdictional 
Practice, 174 N.J.L.J. 751 (2003). 
 169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3 (2000). See also Larry E. 
Ripstein, Ethical Rules, Law Firm Structure and Choice of Law, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1161 (2001) 
(arguing that law firms engaged in MJP should get to choose which set of ethical rules its entire law 
firm must follow regardless of the geographic location of each branch of the law firm). Utah’s 
legislature recently enacted a statute defining “law practice” as “appearing as an advocate in any 
criminal proceeding or before any court of record in this state in a representative capacity on behalf of 
another person,” and limiting UPL restrictions to those engaged in law practice thus defined. This 
narrow definition was intended to make non-representational legal services available to a much 
broader economic segment of Utah citizens by allowing non-lawyers to perform out-of-court services 
that, in many states, would require bar membership. Stephanie F. Cahill, What is Law Practice? Utah 
Defines a Lawyer’s Job to Meet Middle-Class Legal Needs, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Mar. 28, 2003, at 
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/m28upl.html. Although this very narrow definition of law 
practice and the correspondingly broad MJP authorization implicitly created would not lead to the 
same problems that an out-of-state lawyer would face if law practice were broadly defined and MJP 
authorization were narrowed (i.e., because an out-of-state lawyer would not face unpredicted MJP 
restrictions), it illustrates the differences likely to result as each state considers variations on the 
ABA’s MJP scheme. 
 170. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 VAND. 
L. REV. 381 (2002). 
 171. Federal prosecutors must comply with the ethical rules of the state in which they are licensed 
and the federal court before which they are practicing. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2002). 
 172. Complying with both federal and state rules is not necessarily simple, however. Federal and 
state ethical rules are frequently inconsistent and do not provide adequate guidance for resolving 
conflicts. See supra notes 129–132 and accompanying text. 
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know which states’ ethical rules will be implicated in a given 
representation at the outset of the representation. Moreover, a particular 
client’s interests might be implicated in two or more states.173  
The need for MJP uniformity does not create a corresponding need for 
uniformity of all ethical rules. Once a lawyer is practicing in a host state 
pursuant to amended Rules 5.5 and 8.5, the lawyer will be able to 
determine the applicable ethical rules and conform thereto. Thus, the 
central goal of predictability will have been realized. 
Various approaches have been advocated as a means of achieving 
uniformity. For example, the “driver’s license” approach posits that a law 
license ought to be treated like a driver’s license; once licensed, a lawyer 
may practice temporarily in any state, just as a driver who is properly 
licensed in one state may drive temporarily in any state.174 Similarly, other 
proposals to “federalize” ethical rules in general and MJP rules in 
particular have been suggested.175 However, it is unlikely that uniformity 
will be achieved by any of these methods in light of the traditional role of 
the states in regulating lawyers’ ethical conduct and the ABA’s stated 
position favoring continued state control of ethical regulation of 
lawyers.176 
Thus, the best opportunity to achieve uniformity is for states 
cooperatively to adopt the ABA’s new MJP rules with as few substantive 
variations as possible.177 The ABA has carefully balanced competing 
interests and promulgated a regulatory scheme that accommodates states’ 
interests in regulating lawyers within their borders, while recognizing the 
realities of client representation in the twenty-first century.  
 
 
 173. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 911 F. Supp. 148 (D.N.J. 1995) 
(addressing the issue of which of several states’ ethical rules should be applied to regulate plaintiffs’ 
lawyers’ ex parte communication with defendant’s past and present employees). 
 174. See Ronald C. Minkoff, One License for Life: A Paradigm for Multijurisdictional Practice, 
PROF. LAW, Vol. 11, No. 3, at 1 (Spring 2000). 
 175. See, e.g., Moulton, supra note 5. 
 176. See Manson, supra note 166. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2003). 
 177. For example, the state bars in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and South Dakota have endorsed amendments to their states’ rules 
that are similar to the ABA MJP Rule 5.5 and 8.5 amendments. Final adoption of the amendments in 
these states requires action by state supreme courts or state legislatures. See 72 U.S.L.W. 2037 for a 
summary of various states’ recent MJP amendments. See also 71 U.S.L.W. 2106, 2739. 
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